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Chapter 19
Northern Uganda: Protracted
Conﬂict and Structures of Violence
Matthew Kustenbauder
Abstract
This chapter identiﬁes reasons for protracted, low-intensity civil war in Uganda dur-
ing the last two decades. The ﬁrst is located in Uganda’s history, in which social, politi-
cal, and religious processes established the basic structures of violence that continue to
operate in contemporary Uganda, reinforcing cleavages along regional, ethnic, and reli-
gious lines. The second is located in the complex balancing act involved in running a
modern African state. After providing some historical background that frames the con-
ﬂict, the chapter examines how both the NRM government of Yoweri Museveni and
rebel insurgent movements have beneﬁted from insecurity in the country. It argues that
the government accrued political dividends while the Lord’s Resistance Army gained
personal beneﬁts so long as the conﬂict continued. A shift in the geopolitical landscape,
coupled with the diminishing returns of a long-duration, low-level conﬂict, may ex-
plain why both sides recently renewed and intensiﬁed their efforts to negotiate a lasting
peace. The chapter concludes by identifying two elements—personal security for the
rebels, and northern development and integration—that will be critical in order for a
negotiated peace to last.
Introduction
Conventional wisdom holds that rebel movements are a threat to political elites and
a burden to the state. Thus, it is in the best interests of the state to swiftly end conﬂicts
that might undermine state authority. A growing body of literature turns conventional
wisdom on its head, however, showing that protracted, low-intensity civil war can pro-
vide state and rebel actors with the justiﬁcation and means for accumulating short-term
beneﬁts. Much of the discussion has focused on extreme examples in the so-called failed
states of Liberia, Sierra Leone, or the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).1
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Herbst, “Economic Incentives, Natural Resources, and Conﬂict in Africa,” Journal of African
Economies 9, no. 3 (2000): 270–94; J. Peter Pham, “Making Sense of a Senseless War,” Human Rights
and Human Welfare 7 (2007): 35–51; William Reno, Warlord Politics and African States (Boulder,
CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998); Ingrid Samset, “Conﬂict of Interests or Interests in Conﬂict? Diamonds
and War in the DRC,” Review of African Political Economy 93, no. 94 (2002): 463–80; and Manuela
Travaglianti, “The Role of the State in the Natural Resources and Civil War Paradigm,” Jean Monnet
Working Papers in Comparative and International Politics, University of Catania, Italy, October
2006.
This study aims to broaden the literature by examining the case of Uganda, where
the persistent but controlled threat of insurgency over a period of more than two
decades has served the strategic interests of both political elites and rebel insurgents.
President Yoweri Museveni’s National Resistance Movement (NRM) government en-
joyed significant political, economic, and military advantages so long as low-level
hostilities with the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) continued. The NRM’s domestic
war on terror proved to be a highly effective political strategy, by which opposition in
northern regions of the country was silenced through counter-insurgency measures,
economic growth (primarily in the southern regions of the country) was stimulated
and national debt curtailed through foreign development assistance and relief aid,
and military strength was bolstered through US support. Likewise, a situation of pro-
longed, low-level insurgency gave the LRA a reliable and relatively safe method of de-
fending and reproducing itself as an autonomous political community beyond the
reach of the Ugandan state. LRA leaders employed different survival strategies de-
pending upon the circumstances, even simultaneously engaging in political, eco-
nomic, and military activities in order to strengthen and defend the group’s contin-
ued existence, thereby securing private benefits for themselves and ensuring their
own survival.
After identifying factors that have prolonged the conﬂict, the ﬁnal section of the
chapter brieﬂy considers why peace now seems to be within reach. It argues that recent
willingness on the part of the government of Uganda and LRA rebels to negotiate a set-
tlement may be explained in terms of an erosion of beneﬁts previously ensured by sus-
taining low-level hostilities contained in the north. Building on observations about the
political economy of violence and its driving mechanisms in Uganda, the chapter con-
cludes by suggesting that the peace process must capitalize on recent conditions that
have restricted the ﬂow of private and political beneﬁts, and made the continuation of
civil war unproﬁtable for both parties now. Given the high level of instability in the
Great Lakes region, the ﬁckleness of international donors, and the UN’s hesitation to
commit further resources toward resolving this conﬂict, peace negotiators should make
every attempt to broker a deal before these strategic advantages evaporate.
Before proceeding, however, important background information is required. A
perennial problem of analysis of the conﬂict in northern Uganda is that it often ﬂoats in
thin air, with little contextualization in the broader historical, political, or religious dy-
namics of the region. Wars are complex and multi-dimensional affairs, and this is no
less so the case in Uganda, where violence carries both political and religious signiﬁ-
cance, and violence by state and rebel actors alike is interpreted by members of Ugan-
dan society within a particular historical framework. This analysis attempts to avoid an
overly simplistic view by grounding analysis of Uganda’s ongoing war with the LRA in
history. Thus, I begin with a discussion of particular elements of history, politics, and
religion in Uganda that help explain the coming of the LRA onto the scene, as well as
the structures that prolong it.
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2. Unless noted, the following narrative represents the author’s synthesis of information from a
wide range of sources, which include: Louise Pirouet, “Traditional Religion and Christianity in
Buganda and Acoli” (paper presented at the Seminar on the Societies of Eastern Africa, Centre for
African Studies, School of Oriental and African Studies, London, 8 March 1973); Tim Allen, “Un-
derstanding Alice: Uganda’s Holy Spirit Movement in Context,” Africa 61, no. 3 (1991): 371–5;
Heike Behrend, Alice Lakwena and the Holy Spirits: War in Northern Uganda 1986–97 (Athens, OH:
Ohio University Press, 1999), 23–6; Heike Behrend, “Power to Heal, Power to Kill: Spirit Possession
and War in Northern Uganda (1986–1994),” in Spirit Possession, Modernity and Power in Africa,e d .
Heike Behrend and Ute Luig (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1999), 23–25; Ruddy
Doom and Koen Vlassenroot, “Kony’s Message: A New Koine? The Lord’s Resistance Army in
Northern Uganda,” African Affairs 98 (1999): 7–16; and Lawrence E. Cline, “Spirits and the Cross:
Religiously Based Violent Movements in Uganda,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 14 (2003): 115–8.
3. Tim Allen, Trial Justice: The International Criminal Court and the Lord’s Resistance Army (New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 25–6. For more on the connection between the nineteenth-cen-
tury eastern Africa ivory trade, slave raiding, and the use of abducted slaves in the military, see Paul
Lovejoy, Transformations in Slavery: A History of Slavery in Africa (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2000).
4. Allen, Trial Justice, 26–7.
History, Politics and Religion: The Social
Structures of Violence in Uganda
2
One of the ﬁrst things history reveals is that war and mass forced displacements in
this region of Africa are much older than they appear. Armed traders, mostly Arabs,
who inﬁltrated the Upper Nile region from Khartoum, ravaged the lands of what has
become the Uganda-Sudan border from the mid-nineteenth century. Their incursions
were fueled by an insatiable demand in industrializing countries for ivory in the manu-
facture of billiard balls, piano keys, and other luxury items. In addition to purchasing
ivory, the traders raided the population—often with the assistance of local allies—in
order to procure slaves, who served as porters to transport the ivory north, but were
also sold as sex slaves and trained as soldiers in the traders’ private militias and the
Egyptian army. These events are remembered in oral history, and the pattern of vio-
lence and abductions by the LRA in recent times has followed, perhaps even deliberately
replicated, the plundering and enslavement practiced by nineteenth-century raiding
parties.3
Around the end of the nineteenth century, the region was also affected by a series of
epidemics and natural disasters that claimed the lives of both cattle and human inhabi-
tants. The result was a shift in the population through migration, accompanied by
changes in livelihood patterns. The prevalence of local, small-scale wars and feuds per-
sisted, however, until the around the time of the First World War, when the presence of
British soldiers in East Africa and the recruitment of Africans to aid in the war effort
imposed a degree of stability and peace. The British moved populations and concen-
trated them for administrative convenience through sleeping-sickness control pro-
grams, the designation of local clan groups as separate “tribes,” and the appointment of
clan heads as chiefs who were ofﬁcially recognized by the colonial state. Among other
factors, systems of indirect rule based on artiﬁcially constructed “tribal units” and the
balkanization of local languages tended to accentuate and institutionalize divisions.4
The extent of colonialism’s role in laying the framework for structures of violence
that operate today may best be illustrated in Uganda’s northern neighbor Sudan,
where the creation and/or reinforcement of social, political, and religious divisions
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5. For more on the causes and consequences of conﬂict in Sudan see the following: Abdel Gadir
Ali, et al., “Sudan’s Civil War: Why has it Prevailed for so Long?” in Understanding Civil War: Evi-
dence and Analysis, ed. Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis (Washington, DC: The World Bank,
2005), 193–218; Karen M. Barbour, “North and South Sudan: A Study in Human Contrasts,” An-
nals of the Association of American Geographers 54, no. 2 (1964): 209–26; M. W. Daly and Ahmed A.
Sikainga, Civil War in the Sudan (London: British Academic Press, 1993); Yusuf Fadl Hasan and
Richard Gray (eds.), Religion and Conﬂict in Sudan: Papers from an International Conference at Yale,
May 1999 (Nairobi: Paulines Publications, 2002); Sharon Hutchinson, Nuer Dilemmas: Coping with
Money, War, and the State (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1996); Matthew Kusten-
bauder, “Religious Incitement or Political Manipulation? The Role of Religious Identity in Conﬂict
in Sudan with Special Reference to the Oral Histories of Sudanese Diaspora” (paper presented at the
Conference on Religion and Religious Identities in Africa and the African Diaspora, Western Michi-
gan University, Kalamazoo, USA, 9–12 October 2008); and P. A. Nyaba, The Politics of Liberation in
South Sudan: An Insider’s View (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 1997).
6. Rosa Ehrenreich, “The Stories We Must Tell: Ugandan Children and the Atrocities of the
Lord’s Resistance Army,” Africa Today 45, no. 1 (1998): 83–5.
7. Doom and Vlassenroot, “Kony’s Message,” 7–8. See also Ali Al’Amin Mazrui, Soldiers and
Kinsmen in Uganda: The Making of a Military Ethnocracy (London: Sage, 1975).
intended as a means of control were compounded by the Southern Policy introduced
in the 1920s. Under this policy, the British administered the northern half of the
country, which was largely Muslim, separately from the non-Muslim south. Invest-
ments in infrastructure, commerce, and social and political institutions were re-
stricted primarily to the northern region, while the southern region was turned over
to missionaries. The result has been plainly visible in Sudan’s bloody post-indepen-
dence history. Two devastating civil wars—the first from 1955 to 1972 and the sec-
ond lasting from 1983 to 2005—have led to a fragile peace agreement that may well
result in a permanent division of the country into two Sudans, though this is not
what the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) says it wants.5 In the case
of Uganda, where no Muslim-versus-Christian or Arab-versus-African binary narra-
tive obtains, the legacy of social engineering carried out by the British is perhaps
more subtle and difficult to identify. Nevertheless, the colonial period bequeathed
similar structures of division and violence that have since shaped Ugandan social
and political history. The solidification of social divisions along the lines of ethnic
identities, regional alliances, and religious beliefs beginning in the early 1900s cre-
ated deep cleavages. After independence, customary structures were no longer suffi-
cient to mediate the tensions that existed between competing segments of Ugandan
society.
When Great Britain established the Uganda Protectorate in 1900, they perceived that
the southern agriculturally based kingdoms, especially the kingdom of Buganda, had
much in common with their own European monarchies. The northern pastoralists in-
cluding the Acholi, however, proved more difﬁcult to categorize or control and were re-
garded as primitive. In line with the economic interests of the colonial enterprise, the
British developed the south as an industrially and agriculturally productive zone, re-
cruiting and training civil servants for the colonial administration from among the
Bantu-speaking southerners. The Nilotic-speaking northern regions, on the other hand,
remained largely an undeveloped zone, serving as a convenient source of migrant labor
and military recruits.6 The socioeconomic divisions created under colonial rule did
much to shape the identity of the Acholi people vis-à-vis their southern neighbors.
British policies transformed the Acholi into what some scholars have referred to as a
“military ethnocracy,” a class of people within society who saw themselves as economi-
cally disadvantaged, yet constituting the military backbone of the state.7
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Figure 19.1 Yoweri Museveni.
8. Allen, Trial Justice, 28.
After Uganda obtained independence in 1962, the ethnic division of labor between
the Nilotic peoples of the north and the Bantu peoples of the south came to be reﬂected
in the country’s politics. In particular, politicized cleavages developed between groups
of the north, the north-west, the south and the south-west. The old kingdoms, espe-
cially that of Buganda, kept nationalist sentiments alive and made it difﬁcult for them
to accept anything less than a privileged position vis-à-vis the rest of the country. Exac-
erbating these kinds of regional and ethnic cleavages were the byproducts of British in-
direct rule, religious divisions between Protestants, Catholics, and Muslims, and ten-
sions linked to the system of multi-party politics introduced on the eve of
independence.8
Under the country’s ﬁrst constitution, Milton Obote, a Lwo-speaking Langi from the
north, served as prime minister, while the kabaka (king) of Buganda served as presi-
dent. This power sharing arrangement broke down, however, when Obote’s central au-
thority was threatened by an order from the Buganda regional council for the central
government to withdraw from Buganda. Most southerners, but especially the politically
and economically powerful Baganda, chafed at the idea of taking orders from outsiders,
especially from a northerner. Obote had the support of the military, however, which
was dominated by northerners who found few employment opportunities in their part
of the country and who had been favored for military service under the British. Taking
advantage of his position as head of state and commander of the national army, Obote
dispatched military forces in an attack on the kabaka’s palace. Hundreds of Baganda
civilians and palace guards were killed, while the kabaka himself escaped into exile.
Obote drafted a new constitution that dissolved the federal status of the semi-au-
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9. Doom and Vlassenroot, “Kony’s Message,” 8.
10. Behrend, Alice and the Spirits, 19.
11. Amin ﬁrst invaded Tanzania, which provided the UNLA, backed by Tanzanian forces, with
the perfect opportunity for a serious military response. The attack was a cooperative venture with
Yoweri Museveni’s FRONASA forces, which also joined in the invasion and helped topple Amin’s
regime.
tonomous southern regions, effectively forcing Buganda and the rest of the old king-
doms to come under direct rule by the central government of a single Uganda.9 This
event has been marked as a ﬁrst step in the militarization of post-colonial Ugandan pol-
itics, whereby leaders increasingly resorted to military force to settle political disputes.10
Only ﬁve years later, in 1971, military might again determined the direction of the
country. General Idi Amin, commander of the armed forces and Obote’s long-time po-
litical ally, came to power after orchestrating a successful coup détat that overthrew
Obote. Amin had learned a powerful lesson from the early days of Uganda’s constitu-
tional crisis, when he was the ofﬁcer in charge of the 1966 attack on the kabaka’s palace.
The keys of the political kingdom in Uganda lay with the military sector, and Amin was
all too eager to use them. Amin’s regime is remembered, even in the West, as one of
Africa’s bloodiest and most tyrannical. What is important to note in this context is that
he quickly began courting popular support in the south (at least initially) and protect-
ing himself from any potential counter-coup from soldiers close to Obote. Belonging to
a relatively small ethnic group (Kakwa) from the north-west of the country, Amin
feared that he might soon suffer the same fate as Obote at the hands of a northern dom-
inated army. This meant that northern Lwo-speakers, Acholi and Langi in particular,
became the focus of Amin’s paranoia. As a result, thousands of Lwo-speaking soldiers
were summarily slaughtered after being ordered to report to barracks in an attempt to
purge the national army.
Many Acholi and Langi soldiers ﬂed south to Tanzania, where they formed the
Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) and campaigned against the Amin regime
under Obote’s political leadership. In 1979, with the support of Julius Nyerere’s Tanzan-
ian troops, the UNLA invaded Uganda and ousted Amin.11 Following general elections
in 1980, which were widely disputed as being rigged, Milton Obote regained power
under the auspices of the Uganda People’s Congress (UPC), an Acholi-Langi political
alliance.
Hopes for a return to normalcy in Uganda were quickly dashed, however, when a
brutal civil war broke out in 1981. Disgruntled by the return of old political players and
an alliance that threatened southern interests, many anti-Amin activists from the south
and south-west refused to accept the results. Yoweri Museveni formed his National Re-
sistance Army (NRA) and launched a bitter struggle against Obote’s regime. Obote’s
UPC government was soon faced with guerrilla warfare emanating from a number of
locations within the country. The most dangerous region of rebel activity emanated
from the south, in the region north of the capital of Kampala called the Luwero Trian-
gle. Museveni’s NRA had widespread popular support there, and the government army
(UNLA) met with little success. In January 1983, frustrated with the slow progress and
wanting to break the will of the insurgents, Obote authorized Operation Bonanza.
UNLA soldiers, mostly Acholi, brutalized civilians and NRA forces alike, killing more
than 300,000 people in Luwero District. The indiscriminate killing carried out by Acholi
soldiers was (and continues to be) remembered by the Baganda, perpetuating distrust
and encouraging retaliation for sins committed. It also troubled the conscience of the
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12. There are contradictions in the literature on this point. Behrend, “Power to Heal, Power to
Kill,” 25, suggests that it was the soldiers who opposed the elders’ demands to undergo cleansing rit-
uals. Allen, “Understanding Alice,” 378, places the blame squarely on the elders, while Doom and
Vlassenroot, “Kony’s Message,” 11–12, offer a more nuanced discussion of the role of generational
conﬂict as one reason for the failed demobilization of Acholi troops. It is likely that both sides
played a role in exacerbating the internal conﬂict in different areas of Acholi.
13. Heike Behrend, “Is Alice Lakwena a Witch? The Holy Spirit Movement and its Fight against
Evil in the North,” in Changing Uganda: The Dilemmas of Structural Adjustment & Revolutionary
Change, ed. Holger Bernt Hansen and Michael Twaddle (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1991),
164–7.
Acholi people—transgression of the moral order by Acholi soldiers and the devastation
it brought upon the entire nation played a central role in the religious discourse of sub-
sequent military movements, including Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA).
For their part, Acholi soldiers also suffered great losses at the hands of NRA forces, and
many Acholi began to see themselves as the victims of Obote’s dirty war. Military violence
along ethnic lines only escalated after the Luwero Triangle incident, and tension devel-
oped between Acholi and Langi within the Obote forces. When ﬁghting broke out within
the ranks of the UNLA, Langi troops routed their Acholi comrades, who retreated north
into Acholiland to regroup. In July 1985, Acholi armed forces led by general Tito Okello
returned to Kampala and swiftly defeated the Langi UNLA troops, forcing Obote into
exile a second time. Okello declared himself president, and his Acholi lieutenant-general
Basilio Olara-Okello became commander of the national armed forces. For the ﬁrst time
in the country’s bloody history executive and military power was held by the Acholi.
The UNLA, however, was increasingly weakened by a number of competing factions.
Acholi soldiers used the upper hand to retaliate against Langi and West Nilers, under
whose dominance they had been subject during the Obote and Amin regimes respec-
tively. In the end, the Okellos proved unable to discipline their ﬁghting force. Aware of his
vulnerability, Tito Okello quickly initiated peace negotiations with Museveni that resulted
in a peace agreement signed in Nairobi. Ignoring the agreement, the NRA marched on
Kampala in January 1986, crushed an ineffective UNLA resistance, and brought an end to
Acholi power just six months after it had begun—a source of deep-seated grievance
among some Acholi, who insist that it showed President Museveni to be untrustworthy.
When the military coupists were overthrown by the NRA, thousands of Acholi sol-
diers ﬂed north to their home districts, fearing retaliation from Museveni for atrocities
committed under Obote’s regime. At home, they experienced humiliation as their own
people mocked the defeat, calling them losers and cowards. In addition, their killing
had made them unclean and threatened to bring cen, the spirits of the killed, into the
Acholi communities. This generated internal strife along generational lines, as many of
the soldiers refused to undergo the cleansing rituals administered by the village elders.12
Unable or unwilling to return to normal village life, they committed crimes among
their own people, undermining the elders’ authority.
In March 1986, NRA forces occupied Acholi towns of Gulu and Kitgum, committing
abuses against Acholi civilians and former soldiers. Among the NRA were troops be-
longing to the Baganda ethnic group abused by Acholi UNLA soldiers in the Luwero
Triangle who were eager to settle the score. It seemed clear that the ghosts of the civil
war under Obote had returned to Acholiland to seek revenge, and many citizens held
the unpuriﬁed Acholi soldiers responsible for this misfortune. Enmities multiplied
within the Acholi community as well as between the Acholi and the central government
in the south, so that a process of progressive dehumanization took place on all sides.13
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14. A modiﬁcation of the words of Jesus found in Matthew 11:12.
15. Ehrenreich, “The Stories We Must Tell,” 83.
16. Cline, “Spirits and the Cross,” 116.
17. Unless otherwise noted, sources for this section include: Pirouet, “Traditional Religion and
Christianity in Buganda and Acoli,” 6–9; Allen, “Understanding Alice,” 379–93; Behrend, Alice and
the Spirits, 38–43; and Behrend, “Power to Heal, Power to Kill,” 22–3.
Most Ugandans, but particularly the Acholi, experienced dramatic social upheavals
during and after the colonial period. In summary, some political developments that
may explain the proliferation and endurance of rebel wars against Museveni’s regime
are as follows:
(1) The division of the country into north and south during the colonial period
encouraged regional, economic, political, and ethnic differentiation that per-
sisted after independence. While the British built infrastructure like roads,
schools, and hospitals to serve the rich industrial and agricultural regions in
the south, the north remained largely undeveloped. In addition, the use of
Ganda kings to rule by proxy highlighted differences and increased antagonism
between southern settled populations of agriculturalists, and the northern eth-
nic groups who were largely semi-nomadic herders.
(2) The transformation of the Acholi into a “military ethnocracy” by the British
further solidiﬁed ethnic divisions and had a lasting impact on Acholi identity.
(3) The militarization of politics in Uganda fostered a culture of conﬂict. Follow-
ing Obote’s deposition of Kabaka Muteesa II in 1966, the battle for control over
public life in Uganda was increasingly waged with the understanding that the
political kingdom suffers violence, and violent men take it by force.14
(4) A history of ethnic violence and settling scores perpetuated distrust, escalated
conﬂict, and put the Acholi on the defensive. When the NRA came to power in
1986, propaganda broadcast on the radio and in the print media blamed the
Acholi for Uganda’s problems: “The bloodshed and violence of Uganda’s post
independence decades made many Acholi fear that it was kill or be killed: if
Museveni was not overthrown, they believed his soldiers would destroy the
Acholi.”15
(5) Generational conﬂict between Acholi elders and young men (soldiers) and the
failure to incorporate ex-soldiers into civilian life created a situation of internal
terror. The difﬁculties of demilitarization and the troubles that it brought in
Acholiland reinforced the traditional fears and discourse of witchcraft.
(6) The increasing abuse of civilians by NRA forces conﬁrmed Acholi fears that
they were now government targets. This encouraged many northern peoples to
join the Acholi in defending themselves.16
Religious Dimensions of Uganda’s 
Structures of Violence
17
It was during this time of intense uncertainty and social upheaval that spirit medi-
ums, the most well-known being Alice Lakwena and Joseph Kony, began to appear
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Figure 19.2 Map of Uganda,showing areas of LRA activity.
18. E. E. Evans-Pritchard, Nuer Religion (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), wrote ex-
tensively on the central place of the jogi (spirits) among the Nuer in southern Sudan. The religious
ideas of all the Lwo peoples (ranging from southern Sudan to western Kenya) are quite similar, so
that it is not inappropriate to draw upon Evans-Pritchard’s work among the Nuer when speaking of
Acholi religion. Pirouet, in his description of Acholi religion, relied heavily upon accounts of the
Dinka and the Nuer, who were the most extensively studied of the Lwo peoples.
promising to heal the wounds of Uganda’s violent past by purging wrong elements from
society. It was common for Acholi commanders who retreated north during the Acholi-
Langi inﬁghting of the Obote II era to seek out and attach themselves to these spirit
mediums, who in turn offered spiritual guidance and bolstered the legitimacy of their
cause under such tenuous circumstances. The Okellos, for instance, consulted a spirit
medium before wresting control of Kampala from Obote in 1985. Uganda is not the
only instance of rebel leaders joining forces with local spirit mediums. Indeed, similar
alliances have been noted to have taken place in Sudan, Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique,
and Zimbabwe. Such observations suggest that the religious dimension of violence in
Uganda is not unique. Furthermore, it requires the LRA to be situated not only within
its political milieu, but within the social and religious context of Uganda’s history as
well.
Like many of their Lwo-speaking neighbors in northern Uganda and southern
Sudan, Acholi religious life revolves around the power of jok or spirit. As Evans-
Pritchard has shown in his classic study of Nuer religion, the spirits are at once a source
of good and a source of evil, a creative and a destructive force.18 It is this ambivalence
that characterizes Acholi belief in jogi (spirits), whose power may be used for healing
and for killing. In pre-colonial times, Acholi chiefs (rwodi) would draw upon the power
of the chiefdom jok to ensure the prosperity of the people, the well-being of their live-
stock, and the fertility of the land. In times of war, however, they would also call upon
the chiefdom jok to assist them in defeating their enemies. Likewise, the jogi were seen
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19. Such notions of God and the moral order bear striking resemblance to the Deuteronomic
code of the Hebrew Bible, in which Israel’s obedience resulted in Yahweh’s blessing while Israel’s dis-
obedience elicited Yahweh’s curse. Thus, Acholi religious ideas are not unlike early Judeo-Christian
ones, in which God is conceived of as one who is “holy other” and dangerous to the created order,
the source of both blessings and curses, good and evil.
20. For more on the prominent role of women in Acholi spirit possession, see Allen, “Under-
standing Alice,” 380–81, 386. Allen discusses the association of women with powerful and danger-
ous natural forces in Acholi traditional belief to explain how Alice Lakwena, a twenty-ﬁve-year-old
woman, was able to raise and lead an army of men. In my own research among African initiated
churches in western Kenya, I observed that the majority of those possessed by spirits (both good
and bad) were women.
21. Pirouet, “Traditional Religion and Christianity in Buganda and Acoli,” 8–9. In his study of
traditional religion in Buganda and Acholi, Pirouet observed that while Ganda religion functioned
as a conserving force in society, Acholi religion functioned to facilitate the adaptations and changes
required by a semi-nomadic way life.
as keepers of the moral order. If the people contravened the social order, catastrophe
would follow. If the people upheld the social order, they would receive blessing.19
In the 1850s, around the time of the slave-ivory trade, increased contact with Arab
traders and neighboring peoples brought foreign spirits from the outside world. These
new spirits, called free jogi, were not bound to the locality the way that chiefdom jogi
were, and so they mediated the beneﬁts and dangers of the outside world. With the
entry of free jogi came the rise of cults of afﬂiction, presided over by spirit mediums or
ajwaka, who were possessed by the free jogi. This development marks a “division of
labor” between the chiefdom jogi, which became responsible for the good of the com-
munity, and the free jogi, which became responsible for individual healing through the
ajwaka. Spirit possession, especially of women who were believed to mediate between
the dangerous forces of nature and the community, became a common occurrence
within Acholi society.20
Under British rule, a number of changes took place in the societies of northern
Uganda. “Tribes” were created, chiefs appointed, cash crops were introduced, and labor
migration became the norm. Christian missionaries also arrived in Acholiland in the
early 1900s. Among other things, they introduced Christianity and biomedicine, setting
in motion a complex process of religious change and cross-fertilization. As is the case
across much of Africa, morally neutral Acholi ideas about the spirit world were made to
ﬁt within a rigid framework of dualism, the peculiar product of a distinctly European
Enlightenment Christianity. The Christian god was given the name Rubanga, who it was
explained was the source of all goodness. Meanwhile, all other jogi became evil spirits,
associated with Satan, and were given the name jogi setani. One of the unexpected re-
sults of this “translation process” was that the phenomenon of witches and witchcraft
increased. The hegemonic discourse of the Christian missionaries took an inﬁnite num-
ber of morally ambiguous jogi and converted all but one of them (Rubanga) into evil
spirits used for sorcery and killing. It appeared that the missionaries had produced what
they were actually seeking to obliterate.
In the 1940s, the East African Revival, or Balokole, began a process of indigenization
of the Christian message by Africans for Africans. In Acholi religion, the central idea of
the jogi offered guidance, healing, and power to the individual and the community.21
The Christian principle most closely associated with this idea is that of the Holy Spirit,
which gained increasing importance among Acholi Christians. The choice of expression
Tipu Maleng (literally “clean ghost”) for the Holy Spirit had the advantage of being eas-
ily applicable to the Acholi idea of jok. The identiﬁcation of the Holy Spirit with jok
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22. Kevin Ward, “The Church of Uganda amidst Conﬂict,” in Religion and Politics in East Africa,
ed. Holger Bernt Hansen and Michael Twaddle (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1995), 72.
23. Ward, “The Church of Uganda amidst Conﬂict,” 76.
soon gave rise to the idea of many holy spirits (like jogi). Especially among Acholi in the
Catholic Church, which already possessed a robust cult of Mary and the saints, a whole
new class of spirits appeared on the cosmological scene. With them appeared a new
group of spirit mediums, who opposed the pagan jogi by the power of their tipu maleng
or pure ancestors.
From the standpoint of Western culture, it can be said that many northern Acholi
were not so much Christianized as Christian teaching was appropriated and recast within
the idiom of Acholi religious belief. One implication was the ambiguous relationship be-
tween religion and violence. Warfare in Acholi society had always been integrally related
to spirits and spirit mediums. And although spirit mediums were consulted to guarantee
the beneﬁt of society and the healing of individuals, they could also be persuaded to use
their power to kill. As ﬁgures like Alice Lakwena and Joseph Kony illustrate, the dualistic
framework of Christianity was unable to fully capture and moralize the activity of spirit
mediums in northern Uganda or conﬁne their spiritual activity merely to healing and
preventing witchcraft. Lakwena, and to a lesser extent Kony, merged Christian dualistic
and millenarian ideas with older Acholi notions of the ajwaka and called upon the power
of the jok to defeat their enemies. It was this fusion of religious discourse and political
ideology that inspired and sustained rebel movements.
Another important factor that explains Uganda’s internal divisions as well as the
propensity for popular religion to be incorporated in the principles and practices of
rebel movements is the mingling of church and state politics, and the overlap of church
and state functions in Uganda. As Ward points out, both the Roman Catholic and An-
glican Churches in Uganda are great “folk” churches.22 Through the building of schools
and hospitals, the publication of Christian scripture and other materials in the vernacu-
lar, the preservation of traditional ceremonies and songs, and the patronage of political
parties, these churches have become integrated into the social, cultural, and political
fabric of Uganda. The accidents of history, however, mean that this process has oper-
ated very differently in each church.
When Uganda became a British protectorate, the Catholic Church lost the bid for po-
litical power. The Anglican Church (the Church of Uganda) became the established
church during the colonial period, and since that time it has become increasingly tied to
the Buganda kingdom. The kings of Buganda were coronated in the Anglican cathedral at
Namirembe, and it is reported that congregants would kneel in respect only when the
kabaka entered the church. In 1966, just before Kabaka Muteesa II ﬂed into exile, he
passed his mantle on to the Anglican bishops, telling Bishop Nsubuga: “Ffe tugenda.
Naye Obuganda mubukuume” (We are going. You [plural] should look after Buganda).23
In the absence of the kabaka, the bishops became the focus of loyalty for many Baganda,
and the Anglican Church increasingly took up the role of guarding the traditions and cul-
tural heritage of Buganda. The effects of this close connection between the Buganda king-
dom and the Anglican Church have not always been salutary. The Church has often been
embroiled in bitter political struggles, embodying many of the tensions and conﬂicts of
the state and society. Its relationship to the political parties and various governments has
been ambiguous at the least, with Church leaders maneuvering to preserve their own in-
terests. Furthermore, the strength of the Anglican Church in the south has only increased
a polarization of politics in Uganda, already based on north-south disparities.
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24. Paul Gifford, African Christianity: Its Public Role (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University
Press, 1998), 117.
25. In the early 1980s, Barrett estimated religious adherents as a percentage of the total popula-
tion of Uganda as follows: 50 percent Catholic, 26 percent Anglican, and 7 percent Muslim. David
Barrett, World Christian Encyclopedia (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1982) cited in Ward, “The
Church of Uganda amidst Conﬂict,” n. 2, p. 103.
26. Ward, “The Church of Uganda amidst Conﬂict,” 72.
27. Statistics of the Uganda Catholic Secretariat, The Catholic Directory of Uganda (Kisubi,
1992), cited in Ronald Kassimir, “The Politics of Popular Catholicism in Uganda,” in East African
Expressions of Christianity, ed. Thomas Spear and Isaria N. Kimambo (Athens, OH: Ohio University
Press, 1999), n. 12, p. 268.
While Anglicans have always been intimately tied to the highest levels of the state (all
of Uganda’s presidents have been Anglican, with the exception of Amin who was Mus-
lim), Catholics have had little success in achieving political ofﬁce.24 Moreover, despite
the fact that Catholics are more numerous in Uganda than any other religious group,
political power has consistently eluded them.25 As a result, the Catholic Church has
largely contented itself with building up a “spiritual kingdom” parallel to the state. The
Catholic sense of being deprived of their rightful position has made them an alternative
community within Uganda and “a powerful critical voice vis-à-vis the state.”26 This is es-
pecially the case in Acholiland, which has the highest proportion of baptized Catholics
of any region in Uganda. It was estimated that in 1992 Catholics comprised over 60 per-
cent of the population.27 For a very long time up until the fall of Idi Amin, many Acholi
saw the root-cause of Uganda’s instability to be the result of political injustice directed
toward Catholics. By the time Museveni seized power from Tito Okello in 1985, Acholi
Catholics had already endured a long history of discrimination dating back to the colo-
nial period.
Thus, the longstanding rivalry between the Anglican and Catholic churches in
Uganda has created a tendency toward the uniﬁcation of religious and political interests
and has reinforced the regional and ethnic divisions in Uganda. With any hopes of ac-
cess to the political center dashed, the Acholi faced a new crisis—the specter of a na-
tional army under the leadership of Museveni’s NRA ready to punish the Acholi severely
for their role in the Luwero Triangle massacres and a failed attempt to gain control of
the state. Traditional leadership structures in Acholi had never been strong, and the dis-
integration of the institutional life of Acholi communities caused by decades of war left
a huge void. This, combined with the collapse of law and order, helps explain the rise of
different kinds of therapists who could mediate these things—to address the Acholi
sense of alienation through the religious language of healing, salvation, the elimination
of witchcraft, and puriﬁcation of wrong elements from Ugandan society. When every-
thing else was stripped away, spiritual solutions were the only ones left, amplifying the
power of religious discourse in Ugandan public life.
In identifying the possible causes of the wars against Museveni’s NRM government, it is
important to keep in mind that the actions of the LRA rebels and the NRM government
alike are mediated through a historical framework fraught with social, political, and reli-
gious tensions, each sphere mutually inﬂuencing, informing, and interpreting the other. As
we have seen, the entry of Arab ivory-slave traders in the mid 1800s resulted in adaptations
of Acholi religion, which incorporated foreign elements in order to mediate change and
bring healing within the society. Subsequent political events as well as the introduction of
Christianity had similar effects upon Acholi religious ideas, so that the interconnectedness
of religion and politics in Uganda cannot be overlooked. For this very important reason, it
is neither possible nor appropriate to explain the LRA purely in terms of political causes.
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28. Ehrenreich, “The Stories We Must Tell,” 83, provides a helpful summary of the various theo-
ries used to explain the durability of the LRA conﬂict. Also, Adam Branch, “Neither Peace nor Jus-
tice: Political Violence and the Peasantry in Northern Uganda, 1986–1998,” African Studies Quar-
terly 8, no. 2 (2005): 1–31, discusses possible reasons for the Ugandan military’s failure and reviews
the literature regarding the LRA’s motives.
29. Sam Farmer, “Uganda Rebel Leader Breaks Silence,” BBC News Online, June 28, 2006.
30. Anthony Vinci, “Existential Motivations in the Lord’s Resistance Army’s Continuing Con-
ﬂict,” Studies in Conﬂict and Terrorism 30 (2007): 342.
Uganda’s Political Economy of Violence 
and the Spoils of War
The northern conflict between LRA rebels and the government, prolonged for
more than two decades, has become something like Uganda’s own peculiar institu-
tion. Popular media, the Ugandan government, and even some scholars have pro-
moted what Rosa Ehrenreich has characterized as “the insanity theory.”28 Such ac-
counts are usually devoted to graphic descriptions of the LRA’s brutality against
Acholi citizens, suggesting that the only possible explanation for such violence is that
Joseph Kony is insane. Others have seized upon ideological elements that make the
LRA equally sensational or exotic to Western readers, such as the group’s initial claim
that it wished to establish a new government in Uganda based on the Ten Command-
ments. It is difficult to read news coverage of the conflict without encountering stock
quotes like this one by Farmer: “The LRA have combined the fanaticism of a cult
with ruthless military efficiency, and while its apparent aim is to impose the Ten
Commandments on Uganda its means could scarcely have been more evil.”29 Implicit
in such evaluations is the notion that Joseph Kony and the LRA are exemplars of il-
logical and amoral African violence. The problem is that statements like Farmer’s,
ubiquitous in the popular media, obscure the underlying motivations and interests
that perpetuate the conflict. Furthermore, insanity, barbarism, and religious fanati-
cism suggest irrationality, making negotiations unlikely if not impossible. Such im-
pressions of the rebels as “irrational actors” serves the interests of the Ugandan gov-
ernment, letting Museveni and other high-ranking NRM officials off the hook, since
neither Uganda’s citizens nor international observers can blame them for failing to
make deals with such people.
Speculation by the popular media on the question of why the LRA continues to ﬁght
without any hope of removing Museveni and the NRM from power echoes debates
within the academic literature over the agenda of the LRA. Some scholars have taken
the position that the LRA has no clear political agenda or strategy. This is the position
of Vinci, for instance, who writes, “throughout the conﬂict neither Kony, nor any other
member of the organization, has produced a clear and sustained description of the real-
istic goals of the organization.”30 Vinci makes a compelling case for the existential na-
ture of the LRA’s motivations. However, the weakness of his argument is that he denies
the inﬂuence of the political, economic, and Sudanese factors on the LRA in order to
bolster his point. This is because he frames his analysis in terms of motivations rather
than beneﬁts, thus failing to see that the political, economic, and Sudanese factors serve
as useful strategies to accumulate private beneﬁts. Van Acker, meanwhile, focuses on the
LRA’s religious motivations. He suggests that their activities constitute a kind of “reli-
gious terrorism,” which does not so much seek “political gains” as it does the rejection
of “the rules of society” through violence, which is “divinely decreed, and hence
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31. Frank Van Acker, “Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army: The New Order No One Or-
dered,” African Affairs 103, no. 412 (2004): 349.
32. David Keen, The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars (Oxford: Oxford University
Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998).
morally justiﬁed, almost as a sacramental act.”31 On the one hand, Van Acker’s analysis
makes an important contribution to the literature by acknowledging the importance of
religious ideology in mobilizing radical social movements and justifying acts of violence.
On the other hand, such comments also reﬂect the problem with much of the literature
on the LRA. By focusing on the violence rather than the results it produces, analysts fail
to grasp the LRA’s simple logic and the strategic value of terrorizing its own people.
This essay takes a different explanatory route by focusing on the beneﬁts that have
accrued to actors on each side of the conﬂict. It suggests that there are logical reasons
why the ﬁghting has continued in northern Uganda, where violence has become a con-
stitutive element of the social and political structures as well as an engine of economic
production. Such an approach builds upon the work of David Keen, who, in developing
his argument for civil war’s economic functions, has shown that conﬂicts can provide
rebel groups and state functionaries with the cover they need to extract valuable re-
sources.32 Despite the heavy costs exacted in the destruction of lives, infrastructure, and
social institutions, war—and the conditions of violence and instability that accompany
war—can be an effective and proﬁtable production strategy, not just for rebel groups,
but for the state as well.
The following discussion will demonstrate the speciﬁc argument that for both Kony’s
LRA and Museveni’s NRM government, a situation of low-intensity war provided the jus-
tiﬁcation and the means by which both sides have engaged in the accumulation of beneﬁts.
More broadly, however, the dynamics of this conﬂict ﬁt within the social, political, and re-
ligious history described above. Both parties to the conﬂict continue to operate within so-
cial and political processes and structures, forged in Uganda’s past, that perpetuate divi-
sion and foster mistrust. Meanwhile, the social costs of the conﬂict—that is, of the LRA’s
material reproduction and the NRM government’s political reproduction—have been
paid by the northern Acholi peasantry. More immediately, the war continues because, de-
spite the risks involved in prolonging the ﬁghting, the parties also have much to lose if they
settle the conﬂict. Violence creates and sustains the conditions of the LRA’s existence, just
as the need for security and counter-insurgency operations justify the actions of the gov-
ernment and its military to the Ugandan public. Against the backdrop of Uganda’s com-
plex history, however, it is certain that the kind of simple cost-beneﬁt-analysis each party
engages in is also heavily inﬂuenced by a set of social and political categories deeply lodged
in Ugandan popular memory. Such categories, structures, and processes—the legacies of
both historical events and historical productions—impinge upon the actions and atti-
tudes of both sides, limiting the possibilities considered in resolving the conﬂict.
Joseph Kony’s LRA 
and the Personal Beneﬁts of War
Before discussing the beneﬁts gained by the LRA through the perpetuation of war, it
is important to say a word about the nature of such beneﬁts. It has sometimes been ar-
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33. Robert Gersony, The Anguish of Northern Uganda, report submitted to the US Embassy,
Kampala and USAID mission, Kampala (August 1997), 35, gives a ﬁgure of between 3,000–4,000. A
more recent report by Tim Allen, War and Justice in Northern Uganda: An Assessment of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court’s Intervention (London: Crisis States Research Centre and Development Stud-
ies Institute, London School of Economics, 2005), iii, estimates the total number of people with the
LRA, including women and children, to be between 1,000–2,000.
34. These factors all come under what Vinci refers to as the “existential motivations” of the LRA.
The signiﬁcance of the LRA case for research on violence and conﬂict is that it provides evidence
challenging the assertion that individuals are reluctant to engage in rebel movements because they
do so at great personal risk. In northern Uganda, however, it appears that there are real gains to be
made by joining and much to lose by leaving the LRA. In addition to examples cited above, of some
note is Blattman’s research in northern Uganda, which found that economic disadvantages created
by the loss of education and training were the single most signiﬁcant barrier to the reintegration of
former child soldiers. See Christopher Blattman, “The Consequences of War and the Determinants
of Successful Reintegration of Youth Combatants in Africa” (paper presented at the annual African
Studies Association Conference, 2006).
gued that Joseph Kony’s LRA is little more than an armed group of venture capitalists,
who use violence and the threat of violence to sustain their way of life and accumulate
wealth. Such characterizations, while overly simplistic, point to the fact that for a rebel
group like the LRA, the individual interests of its members are inextricably tied to the
organization’s success and survival.
It is important to understand what beneﬁts, if any, the LRA gains by ﬁghting a war it
knows it cannot win. I argue that the LRA is not so much concerned with winning as it
is with reproduction; that is, the continuation of its existence as an autonomous politi-
cal community. Because it is an exclusive community sustained through violence
against those outside of itself, the potential for LRA members—especially those born
into the organization—to return to wider Ugandan society is foreclosed. Members of
the LRA ﬁnd their raison d’être within this alternative community, one with its own hi-
erarchy, cultural and religious institutions, and criteria for assigning rewards, punish-
ments, and status. Thus, the LRA has continued because it provides a kind of existential
motivation to its members that skews the normal cost-beneﬁt analysis undertaken when
considering alternatives to war. The LRA is a relatively small community, perhaps not
more than 3,000 persons in all,33 and because it operates independently of the state, the
beneﬁts secured through violence or coercion need not be shared with those outside the
organization (e.g., with the Acholi people for whom the LRA claims to be ﬁghting).
Furthermore, the personal costs of leaving the organization or giving up the ﬁght are
high. Many LRA soldiers have wives and children in the bush who rely on the LRA’s
continued activities for their daily provision. Deserters are killed if caught, and those
who receive amnesty from the government often endure humiliation and hardship
upon returning to their local communities. Work is scarce in northern Uganda, even
more so for demobilized rebel soldiers with little education and no technical skills aside
from warfare.34
Strategies of Personal Beneﬁt
For these reasons, the terms “personal,” “private,” and “existential” characterize the
kind of beneﬁts received by LRA members in a situation of protracted war. In addition,
while it is important to acknowledge that the LRA regularly engages in politics, com-
merce, and warfare—all ostensibly public endeavors—this does not contradict the fact
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Figure 19.3 LRA Commanders,with Joseph Kony in center.
35. Branch, “Neither Peace nor Justice,” 19.
36. Doom and Vlassenroot, “Kony’s Message,” 26. Cf. Allen, Trial Justice, 43, who notes that for
some time the LRA has produced manifestos and pamphlets listing their political demands, which
have been posted on the Internet, circulated in northern Uganda as printed leaﬂets, and even broad-
cast via a radio station in Sudan called “Radio Free Uganda.” While some demands propose spiritual
solutions to the hardships faced by northern Ugandans, most represent reasonable responses that
seek to ameliorate political, economic, and ethnic divisions separating the north from the south and
provide redress for historical injustices. Generally they call for: (1) an all-party “National Confer-
ence” followed by general elections; (2) a Religious Affairs Ministry to end witchcraft and promote
the Ten Commandments; (3) rehabilitation of the country’s economy and infrastructure; (4) na-
tional unity through intertribal marriage and language instruction; (5) universal education; (6) the
encouragement of foreign investment; (7) an independent judiciary; (8) an ethnically balanced na-
tional army; (9) improved diplomatic relations with neighboring states; and (10) relocation of the
capital to Kigumba in Masindi district.
that the beneﬁts it seeks are of a personal nature. That is, even the LRA’s most public ac-
tivities—such as village raids, abductions, attacks on the government’s Uganda People’s
Defense Forces (UPDF) soldiers, and even peace negotiations—are oriented toward en-
suring private ends.
In order to understand the logic of LRA violence, it is necessary to recognize that
prolonging the conﬂict actually creates political, economic, and military opportunities,
which the group in turn uses to reproduce and preserve itself as an independent organi-
zation. Violence and the restraint of violence has been used as a strategy to exert politi-
cal inﬂuence over Ugandan citizens and against Museveni’s government that would ac-
crue personal beneﬁts to LRA members. In 1996, for instance, the LRA declared a
ceaseﬁre in order for northerners to vote in the presidential elections. Museveni’s oppo-
nent, Ssemogerere, was the clear winner in Acholiland—in some locations receiving up
to ten times more votes than Museveni. Despite this, Museveni carried the more popu-
lous southern provinces, giving him the national victory. After Ssemogerere’s defeat,
Kony again stepped up his attacks.35
Even in the absence of a clear and sustained articulation of political demands by a
rebel group like the LRA, the use of violence against civilians has a “political rationale”
directed ultimately at self-preservation.36 Excessive force combined with the unpre-
dictability of LRA attacks gave LRA ﬁeld commanders a logistical advantage beyond
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37. Doom and Vlassenroot, “Kony’s Message,” 27.
38. For an evaluation of the extent and nature of displacement generated by the civil war in
northern Uganda, see Paul Omach, Civil War and Internal Displacement in Northern Uganda:
1986–1998 (Kampala: NURRU Publications, 2002). Allen, Trial Justice, 53, estimates the IDP camp
population to have been 1.5 million at its peak in 2004. Either way, because the mortality rate in the
camps was so high (1.54 deaths per 10,000 people per day, over 1 is considered to be an emergency),
the point is that millions have been reduced to living in crowded, unsanitary conditions that has re-
sulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands. Restoration of peace in the north following the sign-
ing of the cease-ﬁre agreement on August 26, 2007 has already seen the shrinkage of IDP camp pop-
ulations as thousands of Acholi return to their homes.
39. Vinci, “Existential Motivations in the Lord’s Resistance Army’s Continuing Conﬂict,” 343.
40. Pierre Englebert and Denis Tull, “Flawed Assumptions about State Reconstruction in Africa”
(paper presented at the annual African Studies Association Conference, 2006), 14.
41. Gerard Prunier, “Rebel Movements and Proxy Warfare: Uganda, Sudan and the Congo
(1986–1999),” African Affairs 103, no. 412 (2004), 359.
their actual capabilities. Abductees were forced to kill, or witness the killing of, friends
and family members, identifying them with murder and preventing them from leaving
the LRA.37 Through the strategic use of violence, a relatively small group of LRA rebels
exercised control over a vast population. At one point, over two million civilians were
living in so-called “protective villages” or IDP camps.38 Importantly, the result was not
only fear of the LRA, but also widespread criticism of the government’s inability to pro-
vide security for its citizens. More research is needed on the political strategies em-
ployed by the LRA. However, it is clear from these examples that the LRA has beneﬁted
from over twenty years of conﬂict in the region, using violence as a means of exerting
political pressure while simultaneously safeguarding its private interests.
In addition to using political strategies to achieve its interests, the LRA has also pur-
sued what may be called economic strategies of personal beneﬁt. Indeed, one of the
most basic explanations for the LRA’s continuation of the conﬂict is that it serves as a
proﬁt-making enterprise for those involved. Interviews with various aid workers, ofﬁ-
cials, and analysts in northern Uganda all point to the fact that the LRA’s primary
source of supplies is through raiding operations in the region. “Trucks carrying valuable
goods are regularly looted, especially for anything that can easily be sold in the trading
centers, such as bicycle tires or farm tools. Similarly, the LRA will loot villages, IDP
camps, and, to a lesser extent, World Food Programme food aid.”39 The insecurity in
northern Uganda spawns its own type of informal, wartime economy from which the
LRA is more easily able to siphon off revenue in the form of material goods. There is an
extensive literature on how international interventions such as humanitarian aid can be
used by rebels to prolong the conﬂict. Even the peace process itself, can be used by rebel
leaders as a vehicle for their own personal enrichment. “It should come as no surprise,
therefore, that African transition elites do all they can to prolong these transitions for as
long as possible.”40 Like other groups in the Great Lakes region, the LRA has learned
that rebellion can be a legitimate and lucrative business. By prolonging the conﬂict,
LRA members are able to make a better livelihood for themselves and for their families
than if they returned to civilian life.
The use of military force is a third, and obvious, strategy deployed by the LRA to
strengthen and defend its continued existence and secure beneﬁts for its members. One
frequently cited explanation for the protracted conﬂict is that the LRA has acted as
proxy for the government of Sudan, which armed the LRA in order to punish Uganda
for supporting the Southern People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) insurgency in southern
Sudan.41 Assistance from the northern Sudanese government has not only allowed the
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LRA to continue their lifestyle of rebellion, it has also legitimized and professionalized
their activities—they became well-paid mercenaries ﬁghting against the government of
Uganda and the SPLA. With rear bases in Sudan, the LRA has until recently operated
with a free hand, taking advantage of the protection, security, and immunity that a
wealthy patron offered. In addition to external support, violence and the threat of vio-
lence has been used by the LRA to expand its ranks from within. A key strategy of the
LRA has been to abduct young people, including children, and to educate them to be
part of a new society.42 Some of these recruits are trained as combatants, but others be-
come sexual slaves (given as wives to reward loyal commanders) or serve as porters,
cooks, and domestic laborers in the rebel’s semi-permanent base camps.
In summary, the political, economic, and military activities of the LRA are primarily
instruments of reproduction—strategies whose ultimate goal is the continued existence
of the LRA and the personal welfare of its members. This section has shown how each
of these three “strategies of personal beneﬁt” has been deployed by the LRA. Contrary
to the insanity theorists, there is, in fact, compelling evidence to suggest that rational
calculations guide the LRA’s actions and shape their agendas. Continuing the insurgency
has made logical sense because it served the LRA’s private interests.
Museveni’s NRM Government 
and the Political Beneﬁts of War
The central aim of this section is to analyze why Museveni has failed to resolve the
conﬂict in the north: Is it because he is unable or unwilling? According to Van Acker’s
analysis, the government has taken a “three-pronged strategy” against the LRA: “apply-
ing substantial military pressure on the insurgents, thinning out their ranks with offers
of amnesty, or reviving the political process through negotiations.”43 He argues that the
NRM makes use of and reverses these policies depending on present circumstances and
perceptions, but that there have been “many missed opportunities for peace.”44 By this
account, Museveni and the NRM have made serious and strategic efforts to resolve the
conﬂict but have simply been unable to do so.
Others, like Doom and Vlassenroot,45 Reno,46 and Mwenda and Tangri,47 take a
more critical view of the government’s actions and intentions. This essay argues simi-
larly by exploring the ways Museveni and his government have beneﬁted from the con-
ﬂict and the way incentive structures evolved to favor continuation of the conﬂict. Such
an approach draws upon Reno’s observation that in countries like Liberia, Sierra
Leone, and the former Zaire, leaders of weak states continued to function through the
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adoption of warlord politics, consolidating political power through control over mar-
kets and private accumulation by means of personal networks of afﬁliation.48 The im-
portance of Reno’s work here is the notion that political ﬁgures, entrusted with over-
seeing institutions intended to deliver public goods, may also use their privileged
access as state functionaries to manipulate these institutions, thereby giving them po-
litical advantages. Although Uganda can hardly be classiﬁed as a warlord state, the
same principles may be observed. The following discussion considers three categories
of beneﬁts that Museveni and the NRM received by prolonging the conﬂict in northern
Uganda—political beneﬁts, military beneﬁts, and economic beneﬁts. While these fac-
tors are inextricably interconnected, they shall be discussed separately for the sake of
organization.
Political Factors
The Acholi are of little political signiﬁcance to the NRM. They are one of several
dozen ethnic groups in Uganda and a minority at that. This means that while conﬂict in
Acholiland undermines Museveni’s popularity in the north, he does not need Acholi
support to stay in power. As long as the violence is contained to the north, most south-
erners do not bother about the conﬂict and even perceive it to be an inter-Acholi war.49
As his re-election in 2006 demonstrated, Museveni’s reluctance to resolve the northern
conﬂict has worked to his direct political advantage in at least two respects. First, his pri-
mary constituents in the southern provinces, who are also beneﬁciaries of NRM policies,
have little reason to pressure his government to make a peace deal with the LRA. In addi-
tion, the horriﬁc violence and weird spirituality of the LRA allow his government to pre-
sent the north as a kind of barbaric periphery. Although Museveni is from the south-west
and not from Buganda, he presents himself to the people in the south as the surest guar-
antee that the oppressions of Amin, Obote, and Okello will not return. At one point, Mu-
seveni even traveled to the north to personally oversee counter-insurgency operations
against the LRA. In doing so, he seized upon the south’s fears and selective memory of
Uganda’s political past, styling himself as the Bagandans’ most faithful defender.
Second, Museveni’s most formidable political opposition, the Forum for Democ-
ratic Change (FDC), is strongest in the north.50 Encouraging a situation of instability
and insecurity in northern Uganda is an easy way for NRM leaders to disenfranchise
thousands of Ugandan citizens and effectively hamstring the opposition. Known for
his hostility against multi-party democracy and opposition leaders, Museveni has
often used the northern conflict to crack down on potential political opposition by
tying opposition groups to the LRA and attacking rivals who question his govern-
ment’s actions in the north.51 As Bøås points out, “the government’s attempt to link
main opposition politicians to armed rebel movements such as the LRA ... is a mes-
sage to the population at large about what constitutes the alternative to Museveni’s
19 falola njoku cx3  2/11/10  2:25 PM  Page 469




	
470 19 · Northern Uganda: Protracted Conﬂict and Structures of Violence
52. Morten Bøås, “Uganda in the Regional War Zone: Meta-Narratives, Pasts and Presents,”
Journal of Contemporary African Studies 22, no. 3 (2004): 297.
53. A. Murunga, “Who is Fuelling the Conﬂict in North Uganda?” The Daily Nation, Nairobi,
February 7, 2006.
54. Cline, “Spirits and the Cross,” 124.
55. Doom and Vlassenroot, “Kony’s Message,” 23.
56. See Ali Al’Amin Mazrui, Soldiers and Kinsmen in Uganda: The Making of a Military Ethnoc-
racy (London: Sage, 1975); Dan Mudola, “The Role of the Army in Society: Lessons from Uganda,”
in The Quest for Constitutionalism in Africa: Selected Essays on Constitutionalism, the Nationality
Problem, Military Rule and Party Politics, ed. Asmeleash Beyene and Gelase Mutahaba (New York:
Peter Lang, 1994).
57. Reno, “Uganda’s Politics of War and Debt Relief,” 416.
NRM.”52 Neighboring Rwanda has also been accused of seeking to destabilize Uganda
through involvement with the LRA.53 Museveni’s rhetoric reveals a pattern in which
the conflict in the north is used as a stick to beat people into loyalty to the NRM.
Cline summarizes the point well: “Clearly, in various ways the continued existence of
the northern insurgencies has been of some political use to the government in crack-
ing down on potential political opposition.”54 Museveni’s frequent criticism of grass-
roots and non-governmental institutions (NGOs) working to negotiate a peace settle-
ment only underscores the political benefits he has gained by perpetuating the
conflict.55
Military Factors
Closely related to the political benefits of the conflict are the military benefits.
One version of the military benefits story suggests that deploying forces on the pe-
riphery is a useful safeguard strategy for any national leader. The proper maintenance
and administration of a disciplined military sector is essential not only to citizens’ se-
curity but also to the security of political elites. Uganda’s history of coups and
counter-coups illustrates the importance of control of the army for accessing power
in Ugandan politics.56 One possible explanation for the prolonged fighting in the
north is that such conflicts keep the army occupied. In many low-income countries
like Uganda, where troops are poorly equipped and under-compensated, it is always
a good idea to keep them a safe distance from the political power center, lest they be
tempted.
Another version challenges the idea that Uganda’s forces are really so ill equipped. As
a “successful” guerrilla leader himself, so goes the reasoning, one would expect that
Museveni should easily be able to eradicate the LRA by military means. Yet the govern-
ment of Uganda has long given the impression that it and the UPDF can do little unless
the LRA decides on its own to give up the ﬁght, and the international community has
obediently delivered millions of dollars in development and humanitarian aid. This pat-
tern has continued for decades, despite the fact that during the same time “Uganda’s
military ... has shown considerable capacity to control territory and accumulate re-
sources.” For instance, during the height of Uganda’s occupation in eastern Democratic
Republic of Congo in the late 1990s, Uganda had about 10,000 soldiers and occupied an
area larger than Uganda itself.57 The irony of the situation is highlighted by northern
Ugandans, who ask, “How can the president support the SPLA, the RPF and Kabila and
still pretend that he is lacking the means to protect the Acholis from the LRA, a ﬁrst step
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58. Doom and Vlassenroot, “Kony’s Message,” 32.
59. Bøås, “Uganda in the Regional War Zone,” 290.
60. Branch, “Neither Peace nor Justice,” 18.
61. Human Rights Watch, “State of Pain: Torture in Uganda,” Human Rights Watch 16, no. 4
(March 2004): 14–15, notes at least six rebel groups that still existed in 2004: The Lord’s Resistance
Army based in the north; The Allied Democratic Forces in the west; The National Democratic Al-
towards peace?”58 The ability to exert such military power in the DRC while claiming to
be unable to deal with an insurgency of a few thousand people over twenty years, even
considering Sudan’s damaging interference, makes the government’s protestations difﬁ-
cult to believe.
Along similar lines, several scholars have cited evidence from the failed peace negoti-
ations with the LRA to suggest that the army itself has at times contributed to the con-
tinuation of the conﬂict to the beneﬁt of individuals in the military and government
alike. Bøås writes:
The durability of the rebellion is, however, also a creation of the Ugandan
army. The peace attempt in 1994 could have succeeded. Kony clearly indicated
that he wanted to come out of the bush with all his ﬁghters. Negotiations to-
wards this end started, but stopped when the NRA commanders insisted that
the only thing to negotiate was the total surrender of the LRA.... The conse-
quence was that the LRA left the negotiations and struck a deal with Khartoum
instead. Years of war and terror were to follow.... Through cell phones, the
LRA commanders continue to talk to key Acholian leaders almost on a daily
basis, but unfortunately most of these attempts at rebuilding trust between the
Acholian elders and their ‘lost boys’ in the LRA have failed due to misunder-
standing or have been sabotaged by elements within the Ugandan army.59
The blatant subversion of the peace talks in 1994 suggests that elements within the NRM
and UPDF wanted the LRA to continue to exist. Museveni’s refusal of Kony’s request for six
months to gather his troops and to leave the bush under the protection of UN observers,
together with his public announcement that Kony had seven days to come out or be anni-
hilated, reveals less about his certainty in the capabilities of the military than his concern to
keep Kony and his followers in the bush. Branch joins Bøås on this score, noting that, just
as Museveni has used the military “to repress political organization among the Acholi to
ensure that they could not effectively demand an end to the war,” it is also the case that he
has at times used elements within the UPDF to cripple or wreck the peace process.60
The extent to which the military has played a role in perpetuating the northern conﬂict
in order to procure beneﬁts is difﬁcult to determine for sure. Other factors may explain
the failure of the 1994 peace talks. After nearly a decade of dealing with the LRA, Musev-
eni had a personal grudge against Kony; the idea of giving in to such a “bandit” was difﬁ-
cult to stomach. In addition, Museveni claimed to have military intelligence that Kony
was using the peace talks to rebuild the LRA’s military capacity and secure additional sup-
port from Sudan. It is very possible that Museveni delivered his ultimatum knowing that
even if Kony refused, it was still the most strategic moment for the UPDF to strike.
There is also reason to doubt the efﬁcacy of the Ugandan military, especially in
mounting a successful counter-insurgency against guerrillas. In the ﬁrst place, the LRA
has not been the only rebel group to challenge NRM rule. Museveni has had to sup-
press literally dozens of others like it since 1986, when his own rebels captured power
and became the ruling NRM government.61 Second, as critics note, substantial re-
sources have been diverted to support military operations in neighboring Rwanda,
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southern Sudan, and the DRC. Uganda’s involvement in these regions may reveal more
about the predatory and corrupt character of its military force than its capacity to erad-
icate rebel groups like the LRA. It also betrays those interests ruling elites consider most
strategic to their political survival, which clearly do not include northern security or
stability. In the case of the DRC, independent researchers and the International Court
of Justice, sitting in the Hague, found that between August 1998 and June 2003 there
were massive human rights violations committed by the UPDF in the territory of the
DRC, including the training of child soldiers in UPDF camps, incitement of ethnic
conﬂicts, and the killing and torture of civilians. However, such activities were ancillary
to the primary enterprise of the UPDF, which was the economic exploitation of Con-
golese natural resources that mostly beneﬁted powerful members of the Ugandan elite,
including Museveni’s half-brother and former acting General of the UPDF, Salim
Saleh.62
This suggests a more plausible scenario in which a complex set of interests,
processes, and organizational structures operating at the national level make solving the
problems in the north low on the government’s priority list. Political and military elites
have little to gain and much to lose (revenues from resource extraction and small arms
trade) by diverting troops from neighboring conﬂict zones and concentrating military
forces in the north. As long as ﬁghting remains on the periphery and does not pose a
threat to central authority, Uganda’s elites will continue to deploy military forces in
neighboring regions outside state boundaries where lootable resources are more plenti-
ful.63 It is also likely that local dynamics in the north involving the UPDF are responsi-
ble for maintaining the status quo. Poor administration and a low-grade war economy
have cropped up around the conﬂict, allowing senior ofﬁcers to proﬁt from allowances,
cattle rustling, and trafﬁcking in army fuel and goods, among other revenue-generating
practices.64 For instance, it is an open secret that the army was heavily involved in cattle
rustling, so that by the mid-1990s, almost all Acholi cattle—the bulk of their wealth—
had been stolen.65 Thus, it is likely that Museveni has given public lip service to ending
the LRA war while making private concessions to retain the loyalty of key political and
military ofﬁcials who might otherwise threaten his power to rule.66
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Economic Factors
In addition to political and military factors responsible for prolonging the northern
conﬂict, Museveni and his government reap economic beneﬁts from it. Northern Uganda
has no natural resources of commercial interest, so economic plundering was not the im-
petus for violence there as it has been elsewhere in Africa, such as Sierra Leone, the DRC,
or even Nigeria. Nevertheless, because of the continued military presence and insecurity
in the region, a low-level war economy has sprouted and become deeply entrenched. It is
hardly surprising that various actors—from national leaders all the way down to local of-
ﬁcials—have come to rely on these new economic arrangements and do whatever neces-
sary to sustain them. This is what Doom refers to when he states, “some government
agents or ofﬁcials are blocking the peace process in the pursuit of a private agenda.”67
There is also the question of the government’s motives in setting up the controversial pro-
tective villages to which many Acholi have been forced to move at the army’s coercion.
Considering the north’s colonial history as a labor reservoir for southern commercial en-
deavors, some have even suggested that the effort to move Acholis off their farms into
camps amounts to little more than forced proletarianization.68
International development assistance also plays a signiﬁcant role in any discussion of
economic beneﬁts that may come as a result of perpetuating the LRA conﬂict. Since Yoweri
Museveni seized power in 1986, Uganda has enjoyed economic growth and some degree of
overall poverty decline. The apparent success of the Ugandan state is viewed as so impor-
tant as to render local failures—including human rights abuses, political manipulation,
and corruption—unimportant.69 A large portion of Uganda’s federal budget and private
sector operations are reliant on foreign aid. The conﬂict in the north, but particularly the
specter of child soldiers and protective villages, gives the government a powerful bargain-
ing chip in its negotiations with donors. After all, what aid agency or Western government
wants to cut funding to a government that is trying to save its people—especially its chil-
dren—from abduction, mutilation, rape, and other brutalities? Moreover, while Musev-
eni’s government does an excellent job of using the conﬂict with the LRA (and Uganda’s
reputation as structural adjustment’s success story) to keep the aid ﬂowing, many analysts
now believe that such assistance actually weakens “internal incentives to build effective ad-
ministration.”70 The bottom line is that Museveni’s government depends on foreign aid for
its economic and political survival, and any means of securing aid that does not pose sig-
niﬁcant disadvantages will be used. The northern conﬂict certainly ﬁts the criteria, making
foreign assistance another means of proﬁt-generation for Museveni’s government.
Summary Remarks on the Beneﬁts of Prolonged, 
Low-Intensity Conﬂict
This analysis has aimed to bring together evidence of the major ways that both par-
ties to the conﬂict in northern Uganda seem to use the war to suit their political, eco-
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nomic, and military interests. It does not argue that the LRA or Museveni’s NRM insti-
gated the conﬂict for the sake of accumulating beneﬁts. Instead, it supports the obser-
vation that “the longer a civil war, the more likely it becomes that people will ﬁnd ways
to proﬁt from it,”71 which suggests that the reasons for continuing a conﬂict are often
different from the reasons that a conﬂict began. In the case of the LRA’s insurgency,
fought over such a long duration, the structures have become entrenched and self-sus-
taining and therefore dependent on the conﬂict’s continuation. Thus, both sides have
had incentives to perpetuate the war. For ordinary soldiers, it is a means of ensuring
regular income and provision for them and their families. For Museveni and regional
and international leaders, it has been a way to bolster political positions and serve their
own political agendas.72 And, for Kony and his commanders, proﬁteers in the business
and military sector, and even government ofﬁcials, it has been an opportunity to accu-
mulate wealth, power, and a certain degree of prestige.
Shifts in the Geopolitical Landscape: Limits 
to the Political Economy of Violence in Uganda
One may reiterate that war can be a lucrative production strategy for both parties in-
volved, but it is difﬁcult to sustain over an extended period. Renewed efforts at peace
negotiations between Museveni’s NRM and Kony’s LRA suggest that there are, in fact,
limits to the beneﬁts gained through sustaining violence and instability. The following
section identiﬁes several possible reasons for the current transformation in the political
landscape—namely, factors that formerly made it advantageous for each party to sus-
tain a low-level conﬂict have now changed. Taken together, these factors have resulted
in diminished resources for both the LRA (e.g., personal wealth, security, and arms for
making a livelihood of ﬁghting) and Museveni’s government (e.g., credibility inside
Uganda, which weakens the NRM’s monopoly on political power, and diminished cred-
ibility abroad, which threatens the ﬂow of essential foreign aid). Such geopolitical
changes have simultaneously threatened to starve the Ugandan economy and under-
mined Museveni’s political hold, as well as hampered the LRA’s ability to sustain itself as
an autonomous and “untouchable” political community. In short, the conﬂict is now
“ripe for resolution.”73
Kony’s LRA and the Personal Costs of Continuing the War
There are several factors that make continuing the war personally costly to Kony and
the LRA. One such factor is due to political shifts in the region. As part of the January
2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed between the northern Government of
Sudan (GoS) and the southern Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), Khar-
toum agreed that it would no longer fund LRA operations, which had formerly been di-
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rected at destabilizing northern Uganda and weakening the Sudan People’s Liberation
Army (SPLA). In fact, the LRA has found itself in opposition to its former patron. As
early as 2004, it was reported that the LRA began ﬁghting GoS troops and raiding GoS
villages.74 In an interview, Kony threatened the Sudanese government, saying, “I want
to tell the Sudanese lords to keep away from us because if they attack us as they have
done this month [March], we will ﬁght and set their villages on ﬁre.”75 The GoS has re-
sponded to such threats by actively combating the LRA, as well as forming an alliance
with the SPLA and UPDF to do the same. The result has crippled the LRA, signiﬁcantly
reducing its funding, access to arms, and ability to sustain itself, including its women
and children. Most recent reports by UN peacekeeping forces (MONUC) operating in
the DRC suggest that the LRA has broken into several smaller groups, resorting to ban-
ditry for daily survival.76
A second factor that has eroded the LRA’s position is the comprehensive Amnesty
Act, enacted by Uganda in January 2000. It has helped to sap support for the LRA, as
ﬁghters (some commanders as well as child soldiers) have trickled out of the forest and
returned home to receive social and economic reintegration beneﬁts provided by the
legislation. The promise of amnesty and ﬁnancial packages makes it more difﬁcult for
the LRA to retain its ﬁghting force and weakens morale. On the government’s side,
there is little to lose. The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) pro-
gram has been funded largely by international donors, not by the government of
Uganda, reinforcing the old pattern that the NRM is only willing to settle with the
rebels so long as it does not cost anything.77
A ﬁnal factor to consider is the reduction in personal security felt by LRA leaders.
The International Criminal Court (ICC) has issued warrants for the arrest of the top
ﬁve LRA commanders. Such action has raised the stakes for Kony and his commanders,
since they now risk being captured by MONUC forces in the DRC or by other govern-
ment forces elsewhere, which would be obliged to hand them over for ICC prosecution
for crimes against humanity. There is little doubt, then, that the ICC indictments have
combined with the other factors mentioned above to push the LRA into its present talks
with the NRM.
Museveni’s NRM and the Political Costs 
of Continuing the War
If there are compelling arguments to suggest that the LRA now stands to beneﬁt
from a peace settlement, evidence for the government of Uganda is even greater. The
constellation of factors comprising the old system that for so long served the NRM’s po-
litical and economic interests has undergone a shift. New developments at the national,
regional, and international level have converged to hold the government of Uganda
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78. Fawzia Sheikh, “Uganda and Foreign Aid,” World Press, 2 May 2005.
79. Allen, Trial Justice, 53.
80. There is evidence to suggest that Uganda’s economy is not, in fact, a glowing success story,
and that structural adjustment policies have encouraged government corruption and consolidation
of power. See Arne Bigsten and Steve Kayizzi-Mugerwa Bigsten, Is Uganda an Emerging Economy?
Report for the OECD project “Emerging Africa” (May 1999); and Mwenda and Tangri, “Patronage
Politics, Donor Reforms, and Regime Consolidation in Uganda.”
81. Allen, Trial Justice, 73.
more accountable to the northern Acholi and to the international community. The costs
to Museveni for allowing the conﬂict to fester, combined with the beneﬁts to be ob-
tained through peace, have brought him to the bargaining table with renewed determi-
nation to reach a settlement.
One important change in the geopolitical landscape is the mounting external pres-
sure on the government of Uganda to solve the LRA conflict and develop the north.
Much of that pressure has come in the form of threats to suspend aid, and Museveni
has good reason to be concerned about the sustainability of Uganda’s economic
growth should foreign donors and capital investors pull out. The amount of foreign
aid entering the country was estimated at $989 million in 2005–06 alone.78 In addi-
tion, while Uganda’s average economic growth rate may stand at six percent, the pri-
mary beneficiaries of such growth live in the south, where the bulk of industry and
modern infrastructure exists. The north, meanwhile, has remained undeveloped.
Ironically, the economic sustainability of such a situation has been made possible by
the financial support of the international community since 1996, when the govern-
ment adopted the policy of “protective villages” as part of its anti-insurgency strategy.
In early 1997, the first World Food Programme food relief was delivered to 110,000
people living in “protected” IDP camps. By 2002, the number of people receiving
food relief was over half a million.79 These figures represent the work of only one of
countless humanitarian agencies that kept the relief operation in northern Uganda
going for years.
By 2003, however, the contradictions in Museveni’s ability to transform Uganda into
an economic success story80 while at the same time drawing international relief organi-
zations into long-term, institutionalized arrangements in the north began to raise the
hackles of observers. UN Under-Secretary for Humanitarian Affairs, Jan Egeland, in
November 2003 described the situation in northern Uganda as “totally unacceptable”
and “the most forgotten crisis in the world,” and he called upon the international com-
munity, the UN, and donors to take action.81 Egeland’s statements revealed the darker
side of Museveni’s policies, which quickly earned the former darling of the interna-
tional community much bad press. Key international donors threatened to pull funds if
the structures of violence that sustained human suffering in the north were not dis-
mantled. In January 2004, the US Congress passed the Northern Uganda Crisis Re-
sponse Act, which in addition to rerouting previously unrestricted aid to assistance
programs in the north, also warned the Ugandan government to reduce corruption and
increase professionalism within the military. Pressure on Museveni increased in 2005
when Uganda lost some $73 million in donor aid due to human rights abuses in the
north, governance concerns, and treatment of opposition politician Dr. Kizza Besigye.
The UK alone pulled $36 million in aid for the second year in a row, directing it instead
to northern development efforts. In January 2006, the UN Security Council passed a
resolution calling on the government of Uganda to do more to protect the northern
population.
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82. Allen, Trial Justice, 74–5.
83. Yoweri Museveni, quoted in “Uganda’s Museveni Dreams of 2013,” BBC News, 11 January
2006.
84. See John Young, “Sudan’s Changing Relations with its Neighbors and the Implications for
War and Peace” (paper delivered at Money Makes the War Go Round? The EU and Transforming
the Economy of War in Sudan Conference, Brussels, Belgium, 12–13 June 2002).
There is little doubt that the punitive reactions of the US, the UK, the UN, and other
international donors signiﬁcantly altered the cost-beneﬁt considerations that up to that
point placed limited value on establishing security in the north. Due to the importance
of donor aid to the Ugandan economy (representing nearly 40 percent of the national
budget), Museveni could not afford to appear indifferent. He moved quickly on two
fronts in order to stave off international criticism. First, he took measures to improve
UPDF military performance and ordered the investigation and prosecution of army
corruption crimes in the north, some of which even implicated the president’s own
brother. Second, he created more space for peace talks by extending the Amnesty Act to
include LRA commanders and giving protection to those who returned home.82
There are other factors besides international sanctions, however, that make the con-
tinuation of the conﬂict a costly affair. One of them is the need to attract private foreign
investment to fund the country’s industrialization. Despite Uganda’s steady economic
growth since the 1990s, the country’s economic recovery has been hamstrung by its
heavy reliance on the agricultural sector (coffee alone accounts for about 30 percent of
the country’s exports) and low production and export earnings. A central feature of
Museveni’s re-election campaign in 2006 was his vision to spur economic growth
through the creation of several industrial estates: “We will build the infrastructure; we
shall advertise the estates. Anybody who wants can come. If they don’t come the gov-
ernment itself can build the factory; they can be privatised later.”83 Peace and stability in
Uganda are essential to whether anybody will come. Despite its containment in the
north, continued conﬂict with the LRA decreases the likelihood that foreign investors
will view Uganda as a safe place to do business.
Another factor is Uganda’s need to remain competitive in emerging regional markets.
Now that a peace agreement has been signed between northern and southern Sudan,
Uganda hopes to take advantage of development efforts and economic growth opportu-
nities generated by an oil-rich southern Sudan. It can only do this, however, if northern
Uganda is itself stable. Uganda’s main competitor, Kenya, already has an economic ad-
vantage. Insecurity and lack of essential infrastructure due to rebel activities places
Ugandan business and government at a distinct disadvantage when competing for lu-
crative business contracts because Uganda will ﬁnd it more difﬁcult to provide reliable
services to its northern neighbor.84
An additional regional factor that makes the LRA conﬂict increasingly politically
costly for Museveni is that it undermines the country’s reputation within the East
African Community (EAC), which is comprised of Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and more
recently Rwanda and Burundi. Uganda is the only member state to suffer from a long-
term civil war that has increasingly been publicized in the regional and international
press. With the fast tracking of the process toward the EAC’s political and economic in-
tegration (as early as 2013) comes increased pressure on Uganda from its neighbors to
clean up its act.
In addition to external pressures to end the war, there are growing domestic pres-
sures for political liberalization in Uganda. This, combined with Museveni’s need to sat-
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bringing peace and justice to the region, see Allen, Trial Justice.
86. International Crisis Group (ICG), “Northern Uganda: Seizing the Opportunity for Peace,”
Kampala/Nairobi/Brussels: ICG Africa Report No. 124 (26 April 2007).
87. The ICC’s role in facilitating peace is hotly contested. Critics claim that the Court’s indict-
ments ruin any hopes of Kony agreeing to a peace. Proponents of the ICC have argued that the
Court (if given a free hand) will discourage future abuses by rebels or dictators—they credit ICC
indictments for bringing Kony and his cronies to the negotiating table in the ﬁrst place.
isfy Western donor nations by implementing democratic reforms in order to receive
Western aid, makes his regime vulnerable. Museveni has been forced to implement
multi-party elections, which means that he can no longer afford to isolate the north. In
the past, marginalization of the north was not only possible but politically advanta-
geous, since it represented the main challenge to Museveni’s government. However, be-
ginning in the 1990s, northern representation in Parliament was required. In the most
recent multi-party elections, opponents to Museveni gained signiﬁcant ground in the
north and the east. Museveni’s political legitimacy at home may now hinge on his abil-
ity to bring an end to decades of ﬁghting and work toward northern development and
integration.
Peace Prospects in Uganda: 
Dismantling Structures of Violence
While considerable emphasis has been placed on negotiations between the Ugandan
government and senior members of LRA rebel forces, it will take more than a signed
agreement to keep rebels from returning to the forest with their weapons. Two major
factors will determine whether Kony and his rebels agree to surrender, and whether
peace can be sustained in Uganda more generally.
The ﬁrst has to deal with their personal security following disarmament. This makes
the current indictments of the International Criminal Court a major topic of specula-
tion. The concern of the ICC is to show that there is not impunity for rebels. The Ugan-
dan government must walk a tight line between appeasing the ICC and giving the rebels
some assurance that they will not simply be handed over.85 The most recent report by
the International Crisis Group suggests that one way forward may be for the remaining
rebel leaders to be given sanctuary in a country that is not party to the ICC agreement.86
While this is a controversial suggestion, everyone involved recognizes the unlikelihood
that the LRA leaders will agree to disarm if they are not guaranteed some form of im-
munity. ICC indictments and international attention, however, may also provide the
LRA with the assurance they need that Museveni will honor a peace deal that guarantees
their immunity. From this perspective, ICC charges that are eventually withdrawn may
not do the job in preventing impunity, but they will have brought peace. Given the
enormous cost of prolonged war in northern Uganda, it is likely that few will complain
if peace is ﬁnally achieved and security returns to the region.87
The second factor determining a lasting peace will have to do with northern develop-
ment and integration. To be sure, security must be restored; it has been the main excuse
for government policies (like “protective villages”) responsible for exacerbating the po-
litical and economic isolation of the north and creating two Ugandas. More impor-
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tantly, however, political elites will need to address the perennial problem of northern
underdevelopment. It is a cause that Kony’s LRA has increasingly championed as of late,
perhaps in an effort to make claims to legitimacy as a political opposition rather than a
self-interested warlord. On this score, it seems that Kony has used international atten-
tion to leverage his position in the negotiations. Museveni is in a difﬁcult position if he
does not make peace with Kony. Now that the entire world is watching, Kony has made
the shrewd move of presenting genuine political complaints. Deep cleavages in Ugan-
dan society will need to be addressed in order for peace in the north to last. Mecha-
nisms to ensure more equal development and north-south integration will go a long
way in addressing the ethnicization of politics and social inequalities and turmoil that
have plagued Uganda since its independence.
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